When You Can’t Sell Your Own Property: ROFRs and the Power of Alienation
Is a right of first refusal (ROFR) always a good thing?
No. Many property owners have found out through bitter experience that a ROFR granting another party first dibs to purchase the property can become a big hindrance.
We’ve covered the pros and cons of granting a ROFR to a potential buyer in a previous blog. One big potential drawback for the property owner/potential seller is unreasonable restraint on his or her “power of alienation,” that is, the property owner’s power to freely dispose of the property through sale or transfer.
This was the core issue in the South Carolina Court of Appeals case Crescent Homes SC, LLC v. CJN, LLC (2024) (read it here), which we’ll go into below. It’s an important case that reinforces the need for clear, precise terms for an enforceable ROFR and demonstrates just what can happen when an ROFR becomes an “unreasonable” restraint.
Restraint on the Power of Alienation: Brief Background of the Crescent Case
The Agreement: Develop and Build Lots for Homes
CJN, LLC bought and developed property. Crescent Homes, LLC was a homebuilder.
In 2018, the two parties entered into an agreement (the Agreement) under which CJN would develop 32 lots in Greenville County and sell them to Crescent to build homes on. This was referred to as “Phase 1.” In “Phase 2,” aka “Future Phase,” the plan was for CJN to develop more lots. Crescent would have the right of first refusal to buy those lots.
The Agreement did not contain any specifics on the ROFR, such as price or procedure, and only stated that “A memorandum of such right of first refusal in a form reasonabl[y] acceptable to the Parties will be recorded in the public records of Greenville County at the Initial Closing.” Such a memorandum was never written or recorded with the County, as the parties could not agree on terms.
Third-Party Offers and Crescent’s Response
The project moved slowly, and while Phase 1 was still in progress, CJN received two separate offers to purchase the Phase 2 property. One was for $775,000 in June 2020, and the other was for $1.25 million in April 2021.
Crescent did not accept or refuse either offer. Crescent argued that it was under no obligation to accept or refuse the first offer, as it was made before the Initial Closing (which took place soon after in August 2020). In response to the second offer, Crescent said the ROFR was not triggered because it was not a bona fide offer. Crescent also filed lis pendens (public notice of a lawsuit affecting real property) after each offer.
Still, CJN attempted to find a buyer, listing the property on MLS and the commercial property listing website Costar in May 2021.
Legal Proceedings in Crescent
For details on the various complaints, motions, and lawsuits filed in this case starting in 2019, refer to the court’s opinion. Here we’ll cover only what’s pertinent to our discussion.
In 2021, CJN sought a declaration that the ROFR was void and unenforceable. The master denied Crescent’s motion to dismiss and issued an order determining the ROFR was unenforceable as it constituted an unreasonable restraint on the alienation of an interest in land.
This appeal followed.
Issue 1: Ripeness
First the appeals court addresses the issue of ripeness, or whether the matter was ready to be litigated when the master made his decision.
Crescent argued that the master erred in ruling on the enforceability of the ROFR, as the matter was not yet “ripe” since there were no pending offers on the Phase 2 property at the time. Crescent argued that since the two previous offers had been withdrawn before trial, there was no justiciable controversy.
The appeals court disagreed.
A justiciable controversy must be real and concrete, not hypothetical. The two offers on the Phase 2 Property were real, even if they were no longer pending at the time Crescent took legal action. The court cites previous cases, including Peoples Federal (1989), that found an offer does not need to be pending, saying, “Once a bona fide offer has been made the matter is ripe.” Additionally, CJN listed the property online for sale, which the court says can be interpreted as an offer for sale.
Issue 2: Unreasonable Restraint on Alienation
Next, the appeals court address the main issue: Did Crescent’s failure to either exercise or refuse the ROFR constitute an unreasonable restraint on CJN’s power of alienation?
A restraint on alienation does not automatically make a ROFR void; the question is whether such a restraint is “reasonable” or “unreasonable.” The appeals court cites Clarke v. Fine Housing, Inc. (2023) (read a summary on our blog here) in which the SC Supreme Court examined three factors:
- The clarity of what is encumbered;
- The price; and
- The procedures to exercise the right
While Crescent argued that the lack of specific terms meant the ROFR was not an unreasonable restraint, the exact opposite is true. Looking again at the three factors:
- Clarity of encumbrance: The ROFR was not clear about what property it encumbered, as it only mentioned “lots,” but the “lots” did not yet exist
- Price: The ROFR contained no specifics on price or how to arrive at a price
- Procedures: The ROFR contained no specifics on procedures
The appeals court affirmed the master’s decision, finding that all three factors support the conclusion that the ROFR did constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
Issue 3: Evidence of the Parties’ Conduct and Intent
Finally, the court considers Crescent’s argument regarding the parties’ conduct and intent. Crescent argued that the master should have looked beyond the Agreement itself to the parties’ conduct to supply the missing terms of the ROFR. Even if those terms were not written down on paper, Crescent argues that both parties agreed on some of the basic terms of the ROFR, and the master should have considered that.
The appeals court did not find this argument valid and disagreed with Crescent, again affirming the master’s finding.
Do You Know What You’re Agreeing To?
The ruling is great news for CJN, who can now sell the property on the free market or otherwise dispose of it without restraint. However, CJN could have avoided all the years, stress, and expense of litigation by either 1. not including a ROFR in their agreement with Crescent at all, or 2. drafting a clear, enforceable ROFR in the first place.
Whether you’re the property owner or the potential buyer, you need someone looking out for your best interests with extensive experience. Gem McDowell has over 30 years practicing law in South Carolina and has handled everything from drafting simple deeds to handling multi-million-dollar commercial real estate transactions. He and his team at the Gem McDowell Law Group can help you draft an agreement that’s favorable to you, or review and explain an existing agreement before you sign, and much more.
Schedule your free consultation today by calling (843) 284-1021.
Seller Beware: Think Twice Before Granting the Right of First Refusal (ROFR)
Is it smart to include a right of first refusal (ROFR) clause in a contract? Not always.
If you’re the property owner/potential seller, think twice before including a ROFR in your contract. The ROFR tends to favor the potential buyer while restraining the seller.
Below, we’ll look at what you, as a property owner, should know about the pros and cons of ROFRs, and what makes a ROFR enforceable in South Carolina.
Pros and Cons of the Right of First Refusal (ROFR) for Property Owners/Sellers
We’ve previously covered the basics of the right of first refusal in South Carolina and some of the pros and cons of including one in an agreement. Here’s a quick recap:
The upsides of a ROFR are clear for potential buyers. They get “first dibs” on buying property when it comes up for sale, giving them the opportunity but not the obligation to purchase it.
Property owners, instead, have the obligation to offer the property to the ROFR holder first* without the guarantee the sale will go through, and with a strong possibility that if it does, the final sales price will be lower than what could have been gotten on the free market. For these reasons, a property owner should not automatically agree to a ROFR clause.
* Note that South Carolina courts in recent decisions have not differentiated between the “right of first refusal” and “right of first offer,” and the discussion of ROFR here also includes rights typical of the ROFO.
Here are primary pros and cons from the property owner’s perspective:
Pros:
- Having a pre-agreed terms and a potential buyer already lined up could save property owner time, money, and effort when it comes time to sell
- Terms of the ROFR could ensure the property does not sell below market value
Cons:
- Keeps property owner locked into terms that were likely determined months or years ago, which may no longer be favorable
- Often deters third-party bids, which can result in a lower final sales price
- Can restrain the owner from selling or disposing of the property entirely
To this last point: A ROFR can act as an unreasonable restraint on the property owner’s “power of alienation” (aka right of alienation), or ability to freely dispose of the property, effectively preventing its sale or transfer altogether. This is the core issue in the 2024 SC Court of Appeals case Crescent Homes SC, LLC v. CJN, LLC. Read more about that case and the court’s decision here on our blog.
Enforceability of Right of First Refusal (ROFR) Clauses in South Carolina
South Carolina courts have routinely ruled that a ROFR is enforceable only when drafted with clear, precise terms that impose reasonable restraints on all parties. In the 2023 case Clarke v. Fine Housing, Inc., the SC Supreme Court laid out criteria for an enforceable ROFR.
An enforceable ROFR should include:
- Clear description of the property being encumbered by the right
- Terms on price
- A fixed-dollar sales price, OR
- A clear formula to determine a sales price
- Terms on procedure
- What event triggers the ROFR
- How notice is given
- How long the ROFR holder has to respond
- What happens if the ROFR holder declines to exercise the right
- The duration of the right
A few things to consider about the duration of the right:
We rarely set forth ROFRs in contracts we draft for our clients here in our practice, but when we do, we make the price extremely clear and always include an expiration date and time, e.g., “This right expires at 11:50 pm ET on December 31, 2026.” An earlier expiration date is generally better for the property owner/potential seller.
If you are the potential buyer, a later expiration date – or none at all – is better for you. Now you can include a ROFR of “perpetual” duration, since the Supreme Court of South Carolina’s January 2026 ruling in the Spring Valley Interests case has conclusively affirmed that the Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP) does not apply to nondonative commercial transfers in South Carolina. This must be explicitly stated in the terms of the agreement for it to be enforceable. (Read more about the Spring Valley case and the RAP here on our blog.) If you are the property owner/potential seller, it’s in your best interest to avoid granting such a right to another party.
Should You Skip the Right of First Refusal Altogether?
If you are the potential buyer, you may benefit from agreeing to a ROFR with favorable terms on price and procedure.
But if you’re the property owner/potential seller, you should strongly consider skipping it, for all the reasons explained above. The benefits, which are small and uncertain to begin with, don’t outweigh the potential downsides, in our experience. If you do want or need to include a ROFR, make sure it’s drafted by an experienced corporate and commercial real estate attorney like Gem McDowell.
For help drafting, revising, or reviewing corporate and commercial real estate documents, call Gem. Gem help business professionals grow their businesses, avoid mistakes, and protect their interests. Gem and his team at the Gem McDowell Law Group serve business owners and professionals across the state from offices in Myrtle Beach and Mount Pleasant, SC. Call today at 843-248-1021 to schedule your free consultation.
What is the “Heirs’ Property Tax Relief Act”? Helping Clear Titles
A new bill to help owners of heirs’ property in South Carolina resolve title issues was signed into law by Gov. McMaster on May 15, 2026. H. 4477 passed unanimously in both the S.C. Senate and the House within the last month and was ratified on May 14.
The widespread support for this bill reflects the growing recognition that heirs’ property – property jointly owned by multiple descendants of the original property owner – is a longstanding problem in South Carolina. The lack of a clear title for heirs’ property frequently leads to both legal complications and family conflict.
Below, we’ll look at what the bill says and does, why heirs’ property is a problem, and whether this legislation can fix it.
What the “Heirs’ Property Tax Relief Act” Does
The “Heirs’ Property Tax Relief Act,” as it’s known, is intended to streamline the process and reduce the financial burden on owners seeking to clear a property’s title.
Beginning with the 2026 tax year, transfers of qualified property to qualified family members will not be considered an “assessable transfer of interest,” and no formal appraisal will be required. Previously, such a transfer would trigger a property appraisal, which could increase the owners’ tax burden.
The Act amends South Carolina Code Section 12-37-3150 and includes the following definitions in subsection (B)(16):
(b)(i) “Heirs’ property” means real property owned by one or more individuals as tenants in common, which was inherited from a relative and for which no formal probate or recorded conveyance transferred clear title to the current owners.
(b)(ii) “Qualified family member” means a person related to the prior owner by blood, marriage, or adoption including, but not limited to, a spouse, child, grandchild, sibling, niece, nephew, aunt, uncle, cousin, or those identified as heir owners by a court of competent jurisdiction.
and the following requirements:
(d) The transfer described in this item is not considered an assessable transfer of interest only if the qualified family members submit affidavits to the county assessor certifying under penalty of perjury that:
- The property qualifies as heirs’ property
- The transfer is between qualified family members, and
- The transfer is for the purpose of clearing title
Once the title is cleared, the property is no longer considered heirs’ property.
Why Heirs’ Property Is a Problem – Consequences of a Cloud on Title
Heirs’ property is created when a property owner dies and the ownership changes but those changes are not properly recorded with the county. It’s often the result of a property owner dying intestate – without a will – but it can also happen if an existing will is not probated. In either case, inheritance is then determined by state law.
Under state intestacy laws, the decedent’s children collectively inherit either 50% of the property (with the other 50% going to the surviving spouse) or 100% of the property (if there’s no surviving spouse). They now own the property in equal, fractional amount as tenants in common. If the situation isn’t addressed, the property can end up with multiple owners with varying ownership interests from different generations.
When changes in ownership are not properly recorded with the county, the result is a “cloud on title,” the legal term for a title with encumbrances or claims. Property without a clear title is:
- Difficult or impossible to sell
- Unable to get or refinance a mortgage or other home-backed loans
- Ineligible for government assistance like FEMA aid
- Expensive and time-consuming to fix later on
Those are just some of the legal and financial issues. Heirs’ property often causes family conflict, as well, if there’s no consensus on whether to keep or sell the property, who should live there, who should pay property taxes and upkeep, and so on. As a joint tenant, one owner may sell or transfer his or her fractional interest without the approval of the other tenants, and/or may file for partition, which can lead to a court-ordered sale of the home.
The situation leaves the owners of heirs’ property uniquely vulnerable to financial liabilities, forced tax sales, court-ordered partition, exploitation from speculators, and other risks. The only remedy is to clear the title.
Will This Act Help?
We hope so. In our experience, many heirs’ property owners don’t clear the title because they don’t realize there’s a problem in the first place, and this act doesn’t address that underlying issue. But this act does address an administrative barrier that could hinder heirs’ property owners who have already decided to clear the title, which could help many South Carolina families.
What To Do Now – Clear the Title and Plan Ahead
Heirs’ property is one of the most common results of what we call Family Malpractice™. With some planning ahead and basic understanding of the probate process, you can avoid burdening your descendants with heirs’ property in the future.
Whether you’re dealing with heirs’ property yourself or you want to avoid creating the problem for your descendants, call Gem at the Gem McDowell Law Group with offices in Myrtle Beach and Mt. Pleasant, SC. Gem and his team handle probate matters and help individuals and families develop personalized wills and estate plans tailored to their unique circumstances. Gem’s also a problem solver who understands how family disputes can complicate inheritance and estate planning, and his goal is to help resolve the legal issues while maintaining good family relationships.
Call today to schedule your free, no-obligation consultation at (843) 284-1021. We look forward to hearing from you.
The RAP Does Not Apply to Commercial Nondonative Transfers in SC: Impact of the Spring Valley Interests Decision
The Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP) is a legal doctrine that limits certain types of future property rights to prevent long-term “dead-hand control” and keep property freely transferable.
South Carolina’s RAP laws were humming along for nearly four decades without any significant changes until just this last year. Those changes:
- South Carolina extended the “wait-and-see” vesting period for nonvested property interests and powers of appointment from 90 years to 360 years in May 2025. This change mainly affects high-net-worth families and individuals engaged in long-term estate planning. Read more about this here.
- The Supreme Court of South Carolina ruled in January 2026 that future property interests arising from nondonative commercial transfers are not subject to any vesting timeframe under state law. This decision affects businesses and parties entering into commercial property agreements involving certain types of future property rights.
The supreme court’s ruling in the Spring Valley Interests, LLC v The Best for Last, LLC (2026) (read the decision here) is important because it affirms the way attorneys and business professionals have long interpreted the law – i.e., that the RAP does not apply to nondonative commercial transactions in South Carolina.
That’s the TL;DR summary of the situation, and it might be all you need to know. But if you are ever involved in complex commercial real estate transactions or leasing contracts, or any other agreements involving future property rights, it’s worth reading on for a deeper look at the history of the RAP in South Carolina and the court’s reasoning in the recent Spring Valley Interests decision, and what it means for you going forward.
Basics of RAP: Curbing “Dead-Hand Control”
The Rule Against Perpetuities came to the U.S. as part of the common law after originating in 17th-Century England. The original intent was to help keep land freely marketable and transferable by preventing a property owner from directing what should happen to his property long after his death through a will or trust.
Without the RAP, a property owner could tie up the land for generations through so-called “dead-hand control,” strengthening the family dynasty, shielding it from creditors and certain taxes, and adversely affecting the local economy.
With the RAP, a nonvested future property interest or power of appointment must vest or terminate within a certain time. This prevents land (or other asset subject to the RAP) from being perpetually tied up and makes it easier to market and transfer.
The Changing Time Frame Under the RAP
This background is germane to the supreme court’s reasoning in Spring Valley.
“Life in Being” + 21 Years
The original common law RAP (CLRAP) limits the period of vesting to “a life in being plus 21 years.” Any nonvested interest must be vested by the time “a life in being” (measured by the life of an individual alive when the will or trust goes into effect) ends plus an extra 21 years. Here’s the twist: A future interest that could, theoretically not vest within that period of time is automatically void at the time of its creation under the common law RAP.
Over the years, many found that “a life in being plus 21 years” was too restrictive and created too much uncertainty, leading to arguments over what, hypothetically, could cause a property interest not to vest within that time. (See: “Fertile Octogenarian” and “Unborn Widow” legal fictions.)
The solution: New laws.
90-Year “Wait-and-See” Period, then 360
In 1986, a model law called the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP) was drafted which made two big changes. First, the timeline was changed from the much-debated “life in being plus 21 years” to a straightforward 90 years. Second, it made the 90 years a “wait-and-see” period, meaning that a future nonvested interest would only be void if still not vested after 90 years, rather than being void from the start.
South Carolina, like many other states, adopted a version of the USRAP. In 1987, SC enacted the SCUSRAP which supersedes the common law rule against perpetuities; see SC Code § 27-6-10 to § 27-6-80. From 1987 to May 2025, the “wait-and-see” period for vesting was 90 years, as it is in the model USRAP law. In May 2025, that period was extended to 360 years.
How does the RAP Apply to Commercial Property Interests?
So far, this discussion has only considered property rights in the context of individuals and families, not commercial property rights. Does the RAP apply to similar commercial property rights in South Carolina as well?
That’s what the Spring Valley Interests decision ultimately clarified.
The rule against perpetuities has always applied to donative transfers, like those made through wills and trusts, which are made voluntarily without expectation of payment or other consideration.
The RAP may or may not apply to nondonative transfers, as in commercial and business transactions, which are made with the expectation of payment or other consideration. It depends on state law.
In South Carolina, the SCUSRAP does not apply to nonvested property interests arising out of nondonative transfers, as that’s one of the exceptions explicitly listed in SC Code § 27-6-50. Accordingly, attorneys and business professionals have conducted business believing the RAP did not apply to nondonative transfers.
Then this case came before the courts to challenge this interpretation.
Spring Valley Interests, LLC v. The Best for Last, LLC Background
In 2017, White Interests Limited Partnership (White) entered into a loan agreement with The Best for Last, LLC (Best). White loaned Best $800,000 to purchase property (Property). In the loan agreement, Best granted White a freely assignable and “perpetual” option (Option) to purchase a 74.25% undivided co-tenancy interest in the Property for a fixed price of $800,000.
In 2019, White informed Best of its intention to exercise the purchase Option. White then assigned the Option to Spring Valley Interests, LLC (Spring Valley). Best and Spring Valley almost reached an agreement but ultimately couldn’t, as Best did not want to reimburse Spring Valley for legal fees.
Legal action followed. Spring Valley sued Best for specific performance of the Option. One of Best’s counterclaims sought a declaration that the Option was void because it violated the SCUSRAP and the CLRAP.
The circuit court found in favor of Best. It reasoned that since the nonvested property rights in question arose out of a nondonative transfer, the SCUSRAP did not apply – but the common law RAP did. Therefore, the “perpetual” Option was void because it violated the strict “life in being plus 21 years” vesting timeline test of the CLRAP. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision.
The decision was appealed.
The Supreme Court’s Reasoning in Spring Valley Interests
Did the appeals court err in determining the common law RAP applies to nondonative transfers in South Carolina?
Yes, says the SC Supreme Court. Its reasoning:
Plain reading of the statute
SC Code § 27-6-50(1) plainly states that the SCUSRAP does not apply to nonvested property interests arising out of nondonative transfers. Additionally, § 27-6-80 states “This chapter supersedes the common law rule against perpetuities.”
The circuit court and the appeals court “resurrected” the common law rule, “breathing life back into the CLRAP,” in the words of the supreme court. However, a plain reading of the statute does not support this interpretation; rather, the wording makes it clear that the common law RAP was no longer applicable in any scenario once replaced.
Intention of the SC General Assembly
Best argued that the South Carolina General Assembly did not intend for the SCUSRAP to abolish the common law RAP entirely but intended for it to apply to property interests excluded by the SCUSRAP. Here, the supreme court looks at the title of the 1987 act, which states the intention “to abolish the common law rule against perpetuities and replace it with a statutory rule…”
The argument that the General Assembly intended for the common law RAP to apply to any property rights is not supported.
Comments on the original USRAP
Additionally, the supreme court looked at comments made by the drafters of the USRAP (on which the SCUSRAP was based), the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (now called the Uniform Law Commission). The supreme court quotes the following excerpts: “A nonvested property interest, power of appointment, or other arrangement excluded from the Statutory Rule by this section is not subject to any rule against perpetuities, statutory or otherwise.” … “The rationale for this exclusion is that the Rule Against Perpetuities is a wholly inappropriate instrument of social policy to use as a control over such arrangements. The period of the rule—a life in being plus 21 years—is not suitable for nondonative transfers…” (Emphasis added by the court.)
Some states have “plugged in” this gap by creating statutes that address property rights related to nondonative transfers and other exceptions in the USRAP, but South Carolina is not one of them. In its opinion, the supreme court says, “These comments speak for themselves and support only the conclusion that the Option is not subject to any rule against perpetuities.”
The case was reversed and remanded.
The Takeaway: Think Carefully Before Signing Away Future Interests
The SC Supreme Court’s confirmation of how the statute should be interpreted and applied could be seen as extreme, and there is always the possibility that South Carolina legislators could amend the law to address it.
But it’s likely this will stick, as it is in line with the trend towards less restrictive RAP laws on both commercial and private property. Dozens of states already do not impose the RAP on commercial, nondonative transfers, and as of January 2026, South Carolina is officially on that list, too.
Either way, if you are a party to commercial agreements in South Carolina that involve future nonvested property interests, act as if the RAP does not and will not apply, and think carefully before signing anything. Such future interests can be an encumbrance on a property that cloud a title and severely diminish its marketability and transferability.
Call Gem McDowell for Help with Contracts and Commercial Real Estate Transactions in South Carolina
Know what you are agreeing to when you sign an agreement. There can be damaging real-world ramifications stemming from an innocuous provision in a contract, such as a perpetual option for a party to purchase property at a fixed price.
Speak with business attorney Gem McDowell for strategic legal advice on drafting and signing contracts, commercial real estate transactions, and more. Gem has years of experience helping business professionals protect their business interests and handling high-value commercial real estate transactions in South Carolina. Contact Gem and his team at the Gem McDowell Law Group, with offices in Myrtle Beach and Mt. Pleasant, SC today by calling 843-284-1021.
Can an Arbitration Award be Appealed? Vacatur, Manifest Disregard, and the Waldo Case in SC
Arbitration is by usually binding, meaning the arbitrator’s decision is final and the parties must legally abide by it. Since arbitration is type of Alternative Dispute Resolution that happens outside the judicial system, courts are reluctant to “vacate” an arbitrator’s decision. Most of the time, the decision stands.
But in rare instances, an arbitration award can be vacated. Federal and state law provide some limited statutory grounds for vacatur, which we’ll cover below.
In addition, some jurisdictions allow for vacatur due to “manifest disregard of the law.” South Carolina does recognize the high standard of “manifest disregard of the law” as valid grounds for vacating an arbitration award, as was reaffirmed by the SC Supreme Court in the Andrew Waldo v Michael Cousins (2024) decision.
Let’s look at this issue more closely.
Statutory Grounds for Vacating a Decision Made in Arbitration
Many states, including South Carolina, base state laws regarding arbitration on the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), first enacted in 1925. Found in Title 9 of the U.S. Code, Section 10 lays out the following limited grounds for vacating an award:
- Corruption, fraud, or undue means
- Evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrator(s)
- Misconduct of the arbitrator(s)
- Arbitrator exceeding powers or failing to issue a definite and final decision
The South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act, found in SC Code Title 15, Chapter 48, contains essentially the same grounds for vacatur as the FAA above, with the addition of a fifth:
- An award may be vacated if there was no arbitration agreement, the matter was not adversely determined under Section 15-48-20, and the party property objected
Vacatur of an arbitration award on statutory grounds is relatively rare. So is vacatur on the basis of the judicial concept of “manifest disregard of the law.”
“Manifest Disregard of the Law” as Judicial Grounds for Vacatur
Manifest disregard of the law occurs when an arbitrator knows the relevant, applicable law but deliberately ignores it. This is different from an error of law or ignorance of the law, which are not grounds for vacatur.
Manifest disregard of the law is not considered valid grounds in all jurisdictions, which makes the SC Supreme Court’s 2024 Waldo decision notable.
The facts, briefly
Michael Cousins is the broker in charge of a realty company that represented National Golf Management, LLC (NGM) as sellers in a transaction. The buyers were represented by a realty company where Andrew Waldo is the broker in charge.
In a subsequent transaction, Waldo represented the buyers again when purchasing 13 golf courses from NGM. Cousins didn’t have a written agreement with any party in this deal, and he didn’t get a commission from it.
Cousins and his company then brought suit against several parties seeking a commission. Cousins, Waldo, and an agent at Waldo’s company entered into arbitration, as they were required to do as members in a local realtor association.
Legal action and arbitration
Should Cousins be awarded a commission for the transaction? The decisions went back and forth:
- The arbitration panel ruled that Cousins was entitled to half of the commission earned in the deal
- Upon appeal, a Master-in-Equity vacated the award
- Upon further appeal, the court of appeals reversed the Master
- Finally, the SC Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and vacated the award
In its opinion, the supreme court starts by “acknowledging – and reaffirming – the rare and narrow basis upon which we may disturb an arbitration award.”
However, if a claim is made that the arbitrator failed to follow the controlling law, then it must be shown that the arbitrator knew of “well-defined, explicit, and clearly applicable controlling law” but “still refused to apply it.” The court has held that in these situations, “the arbitrator exceeded his power by manifestly disregarding or perversely misconstruing the law governing the dispute.”
This high standard is only met when it’s “intentional” or “reckless flouting” of the law – not simply an error of interpretation. In this particular case, Waldo argued that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded statutes governed by real estate agency law; the court agreed.
1. Did the Arbitrators Apply Relevant and Applicable Law? No.
Cousins argued that he acted as a “cooperating broker” with the buyer’s agent and was therefore entitled to a commission based on an “implied contract.” But under South Carolina law pertaining to the SC Real Estate Commission, Act 24 (1997) and Act 218 (2004), a written agreement with a buyer or seller is required for a broker (including a cooperating broker, or subagent) to be entitled to a commission. Cousins did not have one.
Cousins also argued that previous cases recognized the realtor’s right to commission through oral or implied contract. However, these cases were decided before the Acts went into effect, and the law states that the statute’s provisions supersede the common law when the two are inconsistent. (See: Title 40, Chapter 57 of the SC State Code.)
The law is clear: Cousins needed a written agreement in order to be entitled to a commission, and he did not have one. The arbitration panel did not apply this law in its decision.
2. Was There Evidence of Manifest Disregard? Yes.
Demonstrating that the arbitrators did not follow controlling law is one part of applying manifest disregard of the law. Far more difficult is proving that the arbitrator had knowledge of the controlling law but ignored it.
In the Waldo case, the record clearly showed that the arbitrators were aware of relevant and applicable law. They knew of the Acts referenced above and had a circuit court order dismissing similar claims from the same transaction on the grounds that oral and implied contracts in for real estate commissions were unenforceable under the Acts.
The arbitrators ignored the law in favor of focusing on “the procuring cause,” which the chairman brought up in the arbitration hearing. Under this theory, the agent or broker may be entitled to a commission if it can be shown that he or she was the initial cause of the chain of events that led to the transaction, even if he or she did not finalize the deal at the end. Courts recognized this reasoning in some prior cases even in the absence of a written agreement. But the statute is now clear that a written agreement is required, procuring cause or not.
“The Legal End Is Not a Lawless One”: Final Words of the Court
In summary, the record showed the arbitrators knew of the relevant law yet chose to ignore it. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals’ opinion, the award was vacated, and Cousins received no commission.
It’s worth reading some of the court’s musings on the nature and goal of arbitration towards the end of its opinion:
“Arbitration rests on consent of the parties, where parties freely exchange the expansive litigation rights court actions provide for the speed, informality, and finality arbitration promises. But when parties calculate the benefits and risks of their exchange, they do not bargain to have their dispute resolved by whim. Arbitration is designed to be the end, not the beginning, of legal wrangling, and our strict manifest disregard standard for vacatur honors this design by ensuring the legal end is not a lawless one.”
Help with Contracts, Business Law, and More – The Gem McDowell Law Group
If you’re a business professional who needs legal help or strategic advice to help grow and protect your company, call business attorney Gem McDowell. Gem and his team work with business owners and other professionals across South Carolina from their offices in Myrtle Beach and Mount Pleasant. They can help with buying, selling, starting, and growing your business; create and review contracts, arbitration agreements, and corporate governance documents; and provide strategic advice to help you avoid mistakes and protect your interests.
Call Gem and his team today to schedule your free initial consultation at 843-281-1021.
Estate Planning After the One Big Beautiful Bill
The signing into law of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (H.R. 1 of the 119th Congress) on July 4, 2025 has a few very important implications for estate planning. Here’s a brief look at them.
Contact your own CPA and/or estate planning attorney to discuss if and how you are personally affected.
The Combined Exclusion Amount is $15 Million, Permanent and Tied to Inflation
Each individual may transfer up to $15 million, and married couples up to $30 million, tax-free during life or after death, starting in 2026. This $15 million combines exclusions for federal estate taxes, lifetime gift taxes, and generation-skipping taxes (GST) into one.
Read more about this and the history of the applicable exclusion amount / unified credit in our blog here.
1031 “Like-Kind” Exchanges Are Fully Preserved Without Limits
Individuals and real estate investors can defer capital gains taxes by exchanging one investment property for another of “like kind.” The OBBB did not include any caps or restrictions on 1031 exchanges.
Read more about 1031 “Like-Kind” Exchanges here on our blog.
Get Help with Estate Planning in South Carolina – Call Gem McDowell
If you need help with wills, trusts, or estate plans for estates large or small, call the Gem McDowell Law Group. Gem and his team help individuals and families create personalized wills and estate plans that reflect their unique circumstances and wishes. With offices in Myrtle Beach and Mt. Pleasant, SC, we’re here to help. Call us at (843) 284-1021 today to schedule a free consultation.
What is Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing? About the How, Not the What, and Road, LLC.
If you sign a contact, you and the other parties signing are automatically subject to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, an implied principle that holds parties to a standard of fairness and honesty in carrying out the contract.
The covenant does not create or impose new obligations on parties to a contract; it applies to the how of the parties’ behavior, not the what. This is an important distinction that was reinforced in a 2024 South Carolina Supreme Court decision, Road, LLC. v. Beaufort County (find it here), which we’ll look at below.
But first, more about the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and what it does and doesn’t do.
The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The concept of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing comes from English common law and is now an implied covenant in agreements in American jurisprudence. “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement,” according to Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, a legal resource on contract law used by legal professionals across the country.
A key aspect of the covenant is that a party must not undermine or interfere with the other party’s ability to fulfill their obligations under the agreement or to benefit from it. A party who intentionally behaves in such a way is in breach of the covenant.
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not mean that a contract itself or its terms are fair. That is, just because one party believes the contract isn’t fair, that doesn’t mean the other party has violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
This is the issue in the Road case. Essentially, the plaintiff did not like how a deal turned out, but does that necessarily mean another party breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing? Let’s see what the court said.
Did Beaufort County Violate the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing? The Road case
The background to Road, LLC v. Beaufort County (2024) is long and rather convoluted, so we’ll just cover the most pertinent facts here.
In 2006, a developer purchased some undeveloped waterfront property in Beaufort County with the intention of developing it. The 229-acre property is a peninsula connected to the mainland via an access road on a narrow isthmus.
Two lawsuits soon arose from this, one of which was about Beaufort County denying the developer’s request to relocate and improve the access road. Both lawsuits were settled in a 2011 agreement (the Settlement Agreement) which meant the developer could continue developing the property.
Road, LLC (Road) was not a party to the Settlement Agreement. But it stepped in at this point to help out the developer by buying an 0.85-acre parcel of land at the end of the access road from the neighbors for $1.3 million. The developer agreed to buy back that same parcel of land from Road for $5 million once development was complete, giving Road a nice profit.
Here’s where it gets interesting. The developer defaulted on the loan for the peninsula property before developing it, so the lender ultimately took possession of it. Beaufort County then purchased the peninsula property with the express intention of preserving it and not allowing further development.
Road sued.
The Lawsuit: Road Contends Beaufort County Breached the Covenant
Road, LLC and Pinckney Point, LLC (the original 2006 purchaser of the peninsula property) sued Beaufort County, alleging (among other things) that the County breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The matter eventually went to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, which issued its decision in May 2024.
Road contended that all parties to the Settlement Agreement expected the peninsula property to be developed eventually, even if not by the original developer. Road also argued that facilitating the development of the peninsula property was, in fact, the purpose of the Settlement Agreement.
By purchasing the land with the express intent of not developing it – and doing so quickly, without allowing another developer the chance to see and purchase it – Beaufort County effectively destroyed Road’s opportunity to sell the 0.85-acre parcel at the expected profit in the future. This, Road contended, constituted a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The question before the supreme court boiled down to this: Did the Settlement Agreement impose an obligation on Beaufort County not to interfere with Road’s opportunity to find another developer for the peninsula property?
The court’s answer: No.
Beaufort County Did Not Breach the Covenant
“The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot create new contractual duties not already expressed or implied in the contract,” the court said in its decision, which affirmed the result but not the reasoning of the appeals court.
Continuing: “Rather, the implied covenant serves only to govern the manner in which parties to a contract enforce their existing contractual rights and carry out their existing contractual duties—express or implied.”
The Settlement Agreement did not expressly require Beaufort County to give another developer the opportunity to purchase the peninsula land. The court determined there was no such duty from implied contract terms, either, as the Settlement Agreement contained language stating it was the full and complete agreement between parties. Finally, since, in the court’s words, “the covenant may not be relied on to create new contractual duties not expressly stated or fairly implied in the contract itself,” no such duty existed under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, either.
Additionally, the court says that the purpose of the Settlement Agreement was not to facilitate the development of the peninsula property, as Road contended. It was clearly to settle the two pending lawsuits regarding the land.
Had Road, LLC been a party to the Settlement Agreement, perhaps the court would have interpreted things differently. It might have found that Beaufort County did indeed violate the spirit of the agreement and its intended purpose. We don’t know for sure. But as it is, unfortunately for Road, it took a gamble and lost.
Takeaway: Contract Language Matters
As we’ve covered many times on this blog before, the language in a contract matters. Do not depend on implied contract terms or the unwritten understanding of the purpose of the agreement. If something is important to you, put it in writing.
For help with contracts, business law, and commercial real estate transactions in South Carolina, call Gem at the Gem McDowell Law Group. Gem and his team help start, grow, and sell businesses across the state. Gem has over 20 years of experience solving problems, preventing mistakes, and helping businesses thrive. Call or contact us today to schedule your free consultation.
Rights to Land You Don’t Own? Prescriptive Easements and Braswell v. Amick.
A farmer in Newberry County, SC, purchased land that was cut off from the main road. To access his land, he habitually used a dirt road on land owned by a neighbor. This went on for years. At first, the neighbor on the adjacent parcel gave the farmer permission to use the dirt road, but after many years, he no longer wanted the farmer using the road.
Should the farmer have the right to use the neighbor’s land to access his own farm? Or does the neighbor have the right to deny the farmer access to the dirt road on his land?
What do you think?
Easements: Rights to Land You Don’t Own
The scenario above is real, and it’s at the center of the 2024 South Carolina Court of Appeals case Braswell v. Amick (read it here).
The court ruled that the farmer, James L. Braswell, Sr., does have the right to use the dirt road partially located on land owned by his neighbor, James F. Amick.
But why should someone have rights to another’s land? Because of easements. In this case, a prescriptive easement, to be exact.
An easement is the right a party has to land owned by another for a specific purpose. Many common easements, such as utility easements, are typically established by contract, deed, or other legal instrument.
In contrast, a prescriptive easement is not established through documentation but through habitual land use. The party claiming the easement must show open, continuous, and adverse use of the land for a certain period of time to establish the easement.
We previously covered prescriptive easements in a blog here on the Supreme Court of South Carolina case Simmons v. Berkeley Electric Cooperative (2016). The Braswell case aligns with and reinforces the Simmons decision. (Note that the Braswell opinion goes into exceptional detail, but this blog will only address the pertinent background and facts.)
Factors to Establish a Prescriptive Easement in South Carolina
In the Simmons opinion, the court laid out the following requirements for establishing a prescriptive easement in South Carolina:
“In order to establish a prescriptive easement, the claimant must identify the thing enjoyed, and show his use has been open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted, and contrary to the true property owner’s rights for a period of twenty years.”
Open means the use has not been stealthy or done in an attempt to hide use from the landowner.
Notorious means the use was known by the landowner or widely known in the neighborhood.
Continuous and uninterrupted means use that’s consistent over a long period of time (in South Carolina, that’s 20 years) without large pauses or gaps in use.
Contrary to the true property owner’s rights means use that is somehow disruptive, obtrusive, or otherwise unwanted by the true property owner.
Once a prescriptive easement has been established, the property owner cannot interfere with the other party’s specific rights to the land. For example, the true property owner could not block a road that the other party has rights to under a prescriptive easement.
Braswell v. Amick Background and Decision
For years, Braswell, his sons, his employees, and others accessed the Braswell Property by taking a dirt road partially located on the Amick Property. Amick was okay with this at first, and even gave Braswell a key to the gate he installed on the dirt road after buying the property. Later, he no longer wanted anyone on his property, saying that Braswell started “abusing the situation.”
Braswell then sought a judgment declaring a right-of-way over Amick’s property from Highway 76 to his (Braswell’s) farm. Amick denied the existence of the right-of-way.
The circuit court found in Braswell’s favor. Amick appealed and brought up two main issues the appeals court addressed:
- Was Braswell’s use “open” and “notorious”?
- Can the 20 years of continuous, uninterrupted use include time when the land in question was leased?
Let’s look at both in turn.
Issue 1: Was Braswell’s use “open” and “notorious”?
Amick contended that the circuit court erred by not applying the test set forth in Simmons correctly.
In its opinion, the appeals court says that while the exact words “open” and “notorious” were not used in the circuit court’s order, the circuit court did address whether Braswell used the land in an “adverse” manner under a claim of right contrary to Amick. It determined that he did, and adverse use implies open and notorious use. Therefore, the fact that the lower court failed to use the words “open” and “notorious” does not constitute a reversible error.
Unfortunately for Amick, it was the fact that he objected to Braswell’s use of his land after so many years that allowed Braswell to make the claim of adverse use. If Amick had given full permission to Braswell to use the dirt road, Amick could have raised a defense of permissive use, which would have undermined the requirement of using the land contrary to the true owner’s rights.
Issue 2: Can the 20 years of continuous, uninterrupted use include time when the land in question was leased?
Braswell leased land for a time from Sula Miller in order to run his farm before purchasing the land in 1972. Amick contended that during that time, Miller presumably gave Braswell the right to use the land he now claims a right-of-way on. Therefore, that time period cannot be counted towards the 20 years of “continuous, uninterrupted” use as required to establish a prescriptive easement, since use during that time was not adverse, argued Amick.
The appeals court disagreed. It ruled that Braswell did satisfy the requirement of 20 years of “continuous, uninterrupted” land use to establish a prescriptive easement, as there was no evidence of permissive use at the time in the record. The court also cited previous case law (specifically, Simmons and Kelley v. Snyder [SC Court of Appeals, 2012]) rulings that the 20-year time period can be satisfied by “tacking” together periods of adverse land use on the same land as long as those periods were continuous and uninterrupted.
Additionally, aerial photos from the 1980s show a dirt road on the present day Amick Property running to the present day Braswell Property, countering Amick’s testimony that the land was overgrown and inaccessible for a period of time. “These photographs support Braswell’s claim and the circuit court’s finding that Braswell was able to continuously use the road,” says the court.
You Must Be Proactive in Preventing Prescriptive Easements from Being Established
Ultimately, the SC Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision in favor of Braswell. He now has the right to use the dirt road partially located on Amick’s land, and Amick can’t stop him from doing so.
If you are looking to establish a prescriptive easement, you can see the factors (listed above) that are required in South Carolina. You can also see that in recent years, some important decisions coming out of South Carolina’s courts have been favorable to parties seeking a prescriptive easement.
But if you are a landowner who wants to prevent a prescriptive easement from being established, you need to be proactive when you see parties using your land. Some options:
- Stop the land use: Post “no trespassing” signs, erect fences or other physical barriers, send written notices to the party using your land to stop, and/or speak with an attorney about legal actions you can take
- Give permission: Allow the party to use the land so the land use is permissive rather than adverse; be sure to document this in writing and provide a copy to the party using your land
- Sell the land: Consider selling part of the land outright to the party using it
(Note: This list is not exhaustive and does not constitute legal advice.)
Once a prescriptive easement is established, it’s hard to have it reversed. An easement on your property can mean loss of privacy, loss of control, inconvenience, and disruption for you. It can also affect your property’s value and your ability to sell it in the future by complicating or clouding the title and turning potential buyers off.
Call Attorney Gem McDowell for Legal Help and Advice
For help with commercial land transactions, contracts, and more, contact Gem and his team at the Gem McDowell Law Group. He helps individuals, families, and businesses in South Carolina from his offices in Myrtle Beach and Mount Pleasant, SC. Gem is a problem solver who can help you avoid mistakes and protect your interests. Schedule an appointment or a complimentary consultation by calling 843-284-1021 today.
Mortgage Due-on-Sale Clauses: What Homeowners Need to Know About Garn-St. Germain
Due-on-sale clauses are common in mortgages. A due-on-sale clause allows a lender to demand payment in full on the balance of the loan when the mortgaged property is sold, transferred, or otherwise affected. Fortunately for everyday homeowners, there are exceptions to when a due-on-sale clause can be enforced, thanks to what’s known as the Garn-St. Germain Act.
The Garn-St. Germain Depository Act of 1982 mainly addressed deregulation of savings and loans institutions and took other measures to modernize the financial sector. But it also provided protection for homeowners by forbidding lenders from requiring payment in full in many common circumstances, such as:
- Inheritance by a relative
- Transfer to a spouse or child
- Divorce or legal separation
- Taking out a second mortgage or similar loan
- Renting out the property
If you own interest in a property subject to a mortgage, you should know about due-on-sales clauses and when they can and cannot be enforced. Read on for more specifics on the exceptions listed above and others.
When Mortgage Due-on-Sale Clauses Cannot Be Enforced
The exceptions listed in the Garn-St. Germain Act apply to “residential real property containing less than five dwelling units, including a lien on the stock allocated to a dwelling unit in a cooperative housing corporation, or on a residential manufactured home […]” (*Find 12 U.S. Code section 1701j-3(d) copied in full at the bottom of this post or online here [PDF].)
Situations in which a mortgage’s due-on-sale clause cannot be enforced under the Garn-St. Germain Act:
Transfer of the interest in a property to a family member upon death of the borrower. This is a common situation, as property is often inherited by a spouse, child, or other relative either through a will or other estate planning document or via intestacy laws (i.e., when there is no will). Heirs do not have to worry about satisfying a due-on-sales clause in this case.
Transfer to the surviving joint tenant(s) in a joint tenancy upon the death of the borrower. This situation is common among married and partnered couples in South Carolina who own property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. When one dies, the property is then wholly owned by the surviving spouse or partner. Lenders cannot enforce a due-on-sales clause when this transfer happens “by devise, descent, or operation of law” – that is, through a will, intestacy laws, or automatically by law.
Note that the statute includes a type of tenant that South Carolina does not recognize, “tenant by the entirety.” Read more about tenancy types in SC on our blog here.
Transfer to a spouse or child. You can transfer your interest in the property to a spouse or child while still alive without having to worry about the due-on-sale clause being enforced.
Transfer to the borrower’s spouse upon divorce or legal separation. If you transfer your interest in the property to your (soon-to-be) ex as the result of the dissolution of marriage, legal separation agreement, or incidental property settlement agreement, the due-on-sale clause cannot be enforced.
Taking out certain loans secured by the property. You can take out a loan that’s subordinate to the primary mortgage without triggering the due-on-sale clause as long as it doesn’t relate to a transfer of rights of occupancy. This includes a second mortgage, a HELOC, or other similar lien or encumbrance.
Renting out the property for no more than a three-year term without the option to purchase. A renter may live in the property for more than three years but should not sign a single lease with a term longer than three years or the lender may be allowed to enforce the due-on-sale clause. Additionally, including an option to buy on a lease of any length means the due-on-sale clause may be enforceable.
Transfer into an inter vivos trust where the borrower remains a beneficiary and the rights of occupancy stay the same. A transfer into an inter vivos trust (also called a living trust) is protected from triggering the due-on-sale clause as long as you are and remain a beneficiary of the trust and occupancy rights don’t change.
Financing household appliances with a purchase money security interest. Getting financing for expensive household appliances through a store’s financing program is often done through a purchase money security interest (PMSI). This specific exception in the Garn-St. Germain Act stops lenders from enforcing due-on-sale clauses when a PMSI is created for household appliances.
In addition to the eight circumstances listed above, due-on-sale clauses are also barred from being enforced upon “any other transfer or disposition described in regulations prescribed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.”
When Mortgage Due-on-Sale Clauses CAN Be Enforced
We just went over the circumstances in which a lender cannot enforce a mortgage’s due-on-sale clause. But there are still many common situations in which the due-on-sale clause could be enforced, depending on your mortgage’s terms, which you should be aware of. Just some examples include:
- Inheritance of your interest in the property upon your death by a non-relative beneficiary, including a long-term girlfriend/boyfriend
- Transfer during your life to someone other than a spouse or child, such as a parent, sibling, or girlfriend/boyfriend
- Transfer into a trust, except under the specific circumstances described above
- Renting out the property with a lease that lasts longer than three years and/or provides an option to buy
This list is not exhaustive. If in doubt, speak to your mortgage lender and to an attorney about your situation.
What happens if the due-on-sale clause is enforced? In the worst-case scenario, the lender can begin foreclosure proceedings on the house if the borrower can’t pay. More likely, the new owner(s) can take out a new mortgage that will satisfy the old mortgage. Still, this may not be ideal, especially at times when interest rates are high.
Estate Planning, Problem Solving, and More – Call Gem McDowell
Many people do not read mortgage documents thoroughly before signing, so it can come as an unwelcome surprise to have the mortgage lender demand payment in full on the loan citing a due-on-sale clause. That’s why it’s important to know about the due-on-sale clause and when it can and can’t be enforced.
Smart estate planning can help you avoid unwelcome surprises, save your family headaches, and carry out your wishes now and after you’re gone. For help with wills, trusts, powers of attorney, and more, call estate planning attorney Gem McDowell. He and his team help individuals and families in South Carolina create up-to-date estate plans for smart planning and peace of mind. Schedule your free consultation or appointment at the Myrtle Beach or Mt. Pleasant, SC office by calling 843-284-1021 today.
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*Text from the Garn-St. Germain Depository Act of 1982, 12 U.S. Code Section 1701j-3 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2011-title12/pdf/USCODE-2011-title12-chap13-sec1701j-3.pdf, subsection (d):
(d) Exemption of specified transfers or dispositions
With respect to a real property loan secured by a lien on residential real property containing less than five dwelling units, including a lien on the stock allocated to a dwelling unit in a cooperative housing corporation, or on a residential manufactured home, a lender may not exercise its option pursuant to a due-on-sale clause upon—
(1) the creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the lender’s security instrument which does not relate to a transfer of rights of occupancy in the property;
(2) the creation of a purchase money security interest for household appliances;
(3) a transfer by devise, descent, or operation of law on the death of a joint tenant or tenant by the entirety;
(4) the granting of a leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an option to purchase;
(5) a transfer to a relative resulting from the death of a borrower;
(6) a transfer where the spouse or children of the borrower become an owner of the property;
(7) a transfer resulting from a decree of a dissolution of marriage, legal separation agreement, or from an incidental property settlement agreement, by which the spouse of the borrower becomes an owner of the property;
(8) a transfer into an inter vivos trust in which the borrower is and remains a beneficiary and which does not relate to a transfer of rights of occupancy in the property; or
(9) any other transfer or disposition described in regulations prescribed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
What Happens When Easements Are Abandoned?
What happens if an easement is abandoned? While most easements in South Carolina last indefinitely, abandonment is one way to extinguish an easement. In that instance, the original rights revert to the property owner(s).
This sounds straightforward enough, but, as with many legal matters, sometimes straightforward things get complicated.
Case in point: the 2023 South Carolina Court of Appeals case Myers v. Town of Calhoun Falls (read it here). In short, a railroad line built on properties through the use of easements was abandoned and dismantled, and property owners sought to regain their property rights approximately thirty years later.
Questions the court looked at:
- Was the railroad properly abandoned, thus giving the court subject matter jurisdiction and authority to declare the easements terminated?
- Did the property owners wait too long to attempt to regain their rights, and should the doctrine of laches have barred them?
(For a refresher on easements in South Carolina, read more here on our blog.)
Brief Background of Myers vs. Town of Calhoun Falls (2023)
The railroad
Way back in 1878, South Carolina chartered the Savannah Valley Railroad Company to construct a railroad. This necessitated several easements on properties in McCormick County and Abbeville County, SC.
Over the years, the rights to the properties have been conveyed to successors of the Savannah Valley Railroad Company and have been recorded in deeds on the affected properties. The wording in a sample deed presented to the court included language stipulating that the easement was for the purpose of a railroad.
By the 1970s, the railroad was owned and operated by Seaboard Systems Railroad, Inc. (Railroad), which eventually sought permission from the Interstate Commerce Commission to close down the track. Permission was granted, and the railroad was entirely dismantled and removed by the end of February 1980.
Part of the Railroad’s interests in the properties eventually ended up in the possession of the Town of Calhoun Falls and another part in the possession of Savannah Valley Trails, Inc. (SVT), together the Appellants in this case.
The lawsuits
SVT began construction of a walking trail where the railway used to be. Not long after, Annie L. Myers and many other present-day owners of the affected properties (Respondents) took legal action, requesting declaratory relief as to the property rights of the easements. (Separate but similar actions by property owners in McCormick County and Abbeville County were consolidated by the trial court.)
In February 2020, the trial court found that Railroad had abandoned the line, and consequently the easements terminated and the associated property rights reverted to the property owners.
The matter then went to the South Carolina Court of Appeals in 2023.
Proving Abandonment – Which Party Has the Burden of Proof?
SVT argued that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction because Respondents failed to prove the railroad was properly abandoned, meaning the issue was still under the jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board (previously the Interstate Commerce Commission, or the ICC).
The railroad had been abandoned as a matter of fact: the track was dismantled and removed, and Railroad sent a letter to the ICC stating that the line was officially abandoned on February 15, 1980. But SVT argued that Respondents did not produce Railroad’s journal entries documenting the abandonment of the line as requested by the ICC, so the abandonment was incomplete.
The appeals court stated that the burden of proof was on SVT to show that the abandonment was incomplete, not on Respondents to show the abandonment occurred in a particular manner. True, the appeals court noted, the record did not include journal entries as requested by the ICC. But neither did the record contain evidence that Railroad did not comply with its requests. SVT did not meet the burden of proof.
Therefore, the appeals court found that the trial court did have subject matter jurisdiction and had the authority to make a judgement on the easements.
Waiting Too Long – Should Laches Have Barred the Respondents’ Claim?
SVT also argued that Respondents’ claims should have been barred by the trial court by the doctrine of laches.
Laches is an equitable doctrine stemming from common law. It is, as described in Hallums v. Hallums (1988) and quoted by the court in the current opinion, “neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, under circumstances affording opportunity for diligence, to do what should have been done.” In other words, if a party waits too long to take action on a legal issue – like asserting or regaining their rights – they may have lost their chance for good.
Respondents waited approximately 30 years to seek declaratory relief regarding their property rights, despite having the opportunity to do so. The trial court did find this delay unreasonable.
But “The failure to assert a right ‘does not come into existence until there is a reason or situation that demands assertion’” (citing Mid-State Tr., II v. Wright, 1996, quoting Ex parte Stokes, 1971). Additionally, “the party asserting laches must show it has been materially prejudiced by the other person’s delay” (citing the same case).
On this last point, the trial court found that SVT failed to provide evidence demonstrating how Respondents’ delay affected them financially or made them liable if the walking trail were not completed. Since SVT was not able to prove material prejudice due to Respondents’ delay, the appeals court agreed with the trial court that the doctrine of laches did not apply. Respondents were not barred from making a claim.
Get Legal Help from Gem McDowell and His Team
The South Carolina Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the trial court’s decision granting declaratory relief. The court found that the rights to the properties reverted to the property owners (Respondents) at the time the railroad was abandoned and the easements terminated.
Note that it wasn’t until the property owners took legal action that they secured their rights again. If you are in a similar situation looking to regain full rights to your property after the termination of an easement, don’t expect it to happen automatically. You will likely have to take affirmative action to regain your rights just like Respondents did in this case.
For help with easements and more, contact attorney Gem McDowell at the Gem McDowell Law Group in Myrtle Beach and Mt. Pleasant, SC. Gem has over 30 years of experience handling legal matters in South Carolina, including easement disputes commercial real estate, business law, and estate planning. Call Gem and his team to schedule a free consultation at 843-284-1021 or fill out this form today.
South Carolina Rejects the Mortgage Replacement Doctrine
The Supreme Court of South Carolina rejected the mortgage replacement doctrine in the 2023 case ArrowPointe Federal Credit Union v. Bailey (PDF), upholding the decision of the SC Court of Appeals.
Under the replacement mortgage doctrine, if an older (original) mortgage is released and replaced with a new mortgage in the same transaction, the newer mortgage maintains the same priority for repayment as the original.
But the replacement mortgage doctrine is not part of South Carolina law, and the SC Supreme Court rejected it. Here’s some brief background on the case and the court’s main points.
The Background of ArrowPointe Federal Credit Union v. Bailey (2023)
In late October 2009, Jimmy Eugene Bailey and Laura Jean Bailey took out a mortgage from Quicken Loans on their Winnsboro, SC home in the amount of $256,500. In early November, they took out an equity line of credit with ArrowPointe Federal Credit Union (ArrowPointe), secured by a mortgage, with a maximum principal amount of $99,000.
Less than three weeks later, in December 2009, the Baileys refinanced and got a new mortgage from Quicken Loans in the amount of $296,000. At closing, they signed a document saying the only lien on the property was the original Quicken Loans mortgage. Quicken didn’t have ArrowPointe sign a subordination agreement to ensure that it (Quicken Loans) would be paid back before ArrowPointe. It appears the ArrowPointe loan was not discovered during a title search, even though it had been properly recorded and Quicken Loans had constructive notice.
Sometime later, the Baileys defaulted on their ArrowPointe loan, which stood at $187,201.60 in March 2017.
Who Gets Paid First?
In 2017, ArrowPointe filed this action seeking a declaration that its line of credit had priority over the second Quicken Loans mortgage – now held by U.S. Bank – and should be paid first.
U.S. Bank argued it was entitled to priority over ArrowPointe under the replacement mortgage doctrine. ArrowPointe argued that it was entitled to priority, as Quicken Loans had recorded notice of the ArrowPointe line of credit at the time the second mortgage was signed.
A special referee agreed with ArrowPointe, finding that South Carolina does not recognize the replacement mortgage doctrine and that ArrowPointe had priority over U.S. Bank under South Carolina’s race-notice statute (discussed below). The referee ordered the foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the Bailey home. The SC Court of Appeals affirmed the special referee’s decision. The matter then went to the Supreme Court in May 2022.
The SC Supreme Court Rejects the Mortgage Replacement Doctrine
The SC Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. Here are some takeaways from its opinion.
South Carolina Statute is Clear, and the Court is Not a “Superlegislature”
U.S. Bank’s argument for priority was based on the replacement mortgage doctrine, but that is not part of current South Carolina law. The Supreme Court agrees with the SC Court of Appeals that whether South Carolina should adopt the replacement mortgage doctrine is an issue for the General Assembly, not the court, saying, “We do not sit as a superlegislature to second-guess the General Assembly’s decisions.”
Current law is clear. South Carolina has a race-notice recording statute, which is one way of determining the lawful owner of a piece of property when more than one party makes a claim to it. In states with a race statute, the party that records the sale with the recording office first is the legal owner. In states with a notice statute, a subsequent buyer who is not aware of a previous sale of the property, through actual or constructive notice, is considered the owner. The buyer may be made aware of a prior conveyance either through actual notice or constructive notice, such as the recording of a deed which is public record.
In a race-notice statute state like South Carolina, a subsequent buyer must have no actual or constructive notice of a prior conveyance and must record the purchase before the prior buyer. Under this statute, ArrowPointe has priority over U.S. Bank.
Equitable Subrogation Doctrine and Replacement Mortgage Doctrine Are Not the Same
U.S. Bank also argued that because the South Carolina Supreme Court has adopted the equitable subrogation doctrine as an exception to the race-notice statute in the past, it may also adopt the replacement mortgage doctrine.
But the two are different, says the court. With equitable subrogation doctrine, a new party essentially “steps into the shoes” of the existing mortgagee, to use the court’s analogy. The party has changed, but the loan itself has not. With the mortgage replacement doctrine, however, the old mortgage is satisfied and replaced with a wholly new mortgage that may or may not have similar terms. In the present case, the second mortgage the Baileys took out was substantially more than the first – $39,500 more – so the two mortgages were significantly different. The second mortgage was not an exact replacement for the first.
A Thorough Title Search is a Better Solution
A thorough title examination is “inherent” in our state’s race-notice statute, says the court. Quicken Loans should have discovered the ArrowPointe line of credit in a title search and addressed it during refinancing, but it didn’t.
“We conclude the replacement mortgage doctrine invites needless litigation that could be avoided by a simple examination of the title to the real property,” says the SC Supreme Court. “We see no reason to adopt a doctrine that excuses the failure to conduct such a title examination—or, when a title examination is conducted, the failure to ascertain the existence of an intervening lien.” (Emphasis added by Gem McDowell Law Group.)
Don’t take chances or shortcuts when it comes to real estate deals. Work with an attorney who can help you cover all your legal bases so there are no surprises in the future.
Call South Carolina Attorney Gem McDowell
For help with contracts, commercial real estate transactions, and other estate planning and business law needs, call Gem and his team at his Mt. Pleasant office. Gem has over 30 years of experience helping individuals and businesses in South Carolina to protect their interests and avoid potentially costly mistakes. Call 843-284-1021 today to schedule your free consultation.
What is a Lady Bird Deed? Are Lady Bird Deeds Legal in South Carolina?
A lady bird deed, like other kinds of deeds, determines how ownership of a property is transferred and to whom. It’s similar to a life estate deed in that it allows the transfer of property outside of probate. But the big difference is that a lady bird deed gives the life tenant rights to the property that are restricted by a traditional life estate deed, such as the right to mortgage or sell the property.
A lady bird deed – also known as a ladybird deed or an enhanced life estate deed – can be a useful tool in the right estate plan. But it’s not right for everyone, and using a lady bird deed can lead to serious unintended consequences.
Let’s look at what a lady bird deed is and what it does, the advantages and disadvantages of the lady bird deed, and lady bird deeds in South Carolina.
What Is a Lady Bird Deed? What Does a Lady Bird Deed Do?
The lady bird deed was created by Florida attorney Jerome Ira Solkoff in the early 1980s; the name comes from Solkoff’s book and is not a reference to First Lady “Lady Bird” Johnson. Solkoff started using the lady bird deed to address an issue with the traditional life estate.
In a typical life estate, a piece of property (often but not always real estate) is owned by a “life tenant” for the duration of their life only. When the life tenant dies, the property automatically passes to a “remainderman” or “remaindermen.” The life tenant may be the grantor (the original owner of the property), the grantor’s spouse or child, or someone else.
One big advantage of a life estate deed is that the property is not subject to probate. But one big disadvantage – to the life tenant, at least – of the traditional life estate is that the life tenant does not have full rights to the property during their lifetime. The life tenant cannot, for example, sell or take out a mortgage on the property without the permission of the remainderman. Understandably, selling or mortgaging the property goes against the best interests of the remainderman, who would prefer for the property to remain intact with its full value. This clash of interests between the life tenant and the remainderman effectively means that, in most cases, the life tenant is unable to sell or mortgage the property, even if it is legally theirs.
Enter the lady bird deed. With a lady bird deed, the life tenant has full rights to the property during their lifetime, including the right to mortgage, sell, or otherwise dispose of the property without the permission of the remainderman. This is why the term “enhanced life estate” is also used for a lady bird deed, since it’s essentially a life estate deed that gives the life tenant additional rights to the property. Upon the death of the life tenant, the property, or what remains of it, automatically goes to the remainderman (or remaindermen).
Another important difference between a lady bird deed and a life estate deed is that a lady bird deed can be revoked or changed by the grantor alone. By contrast, a life estate deed can only be revoked or changed by the grantor with the permission of the life tenant and the remainderman.
Benefits of a Lady Bird Deed
As covered above, the main benefits of a lady bird deed over a life estate deed include:
- Full property rights to the life tenant including the right to sell or mortgage the property without the remainderman’s permission.
- Ability for grantor to revoke or change the lady bird deed without the remainderman’s permission.
Other benefits of a lady bird deed are the same as a typical life estate deed, which include:
- Avoiding probate. Because the lady bird deed (or life estate deed) directs where the property should go after death, the property passes automatically to the heir without needing to go through probate.
- Help with Medicaid eligibility. If the grantor is also the life tenant, then the property is not considered an asset when the grantor applies for Medicaid. Lady bird deeds aren’t considered a transfer for Medicaid eligibility purposes.
- Prevent property from being used to repay Medicaid. Lady bird deeds (and life estate deeds) prevent the property from being used to repay the state for Medicaid costs related to long-term care after the individual’s death.
- Avoid federal gift tax. Importantly, it does not help you avoid applicable estate taxes.
This list is not exhaustive. Depending on your specific circumstances, you may derive other benefits from a lady bird deed or life estate deed.
Drawbacks of a Lady Bird Deed and Potential Consequences
Lady bird deeds sound great. They provide all the benefits of a life estate deed but without the major drawback of restricting the life tenant’s rights. Plus, they can be changed or revoked by the grantor at will.
But there are two major drawbacks specific to lady bird deeds that can create unintended consequences. These are:
Drawback 1: Lack of widespread recognition
Lady bird deeds are not as common and widespread as life estate deeds and many other estate planning tools. As of now, only five states fully recognize lady bird deeds (usually called enhanced life estate deeds): Florida, Michigan, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia.
While this doesn’t mean you are prohibited from having a lady bird deed if you live in one of the other forty-five states, it does mean that doing so is taking a risk. Your wishes may not be carried out as you want, because the law still isn’t clear on how to handle lady bird deeds in most states.
Drawback 2: Difficulty obtaining title insurance
One of the great benefits of a lady bird deed is that the life tenant does not require permission from the remainderman to mortgage, sell, or otherwise encumber or dispose of the property. But this can cause a problem when it comes to title insurance if the life tenant ever decides to sell or take out a mortgage on the property.
A title insurance company in a state where lady bird deeds are not routinely recognized may refuse to issue title insurance unless it has the “joinder of the remainder,” that is, the agreement of the remainderman or remaindermen to the sale or mortgage. Since, as discussed above, doing so goes against the remainderman’s best interests, it may be impossible to obtain the joinder of the remainder. At that point, the enhanced life estate created by the lady bird deed is no different than a typical life estate.
What if you simply don’t get title insurance and go ahead with the sale? It’s true that title insurance is not required for every sale. But skipping the title insurance doesn’t address the underlying problem, which is that the remainderman has a vested interest in the property and can bring a claim in the future. Fighting such claims in and out of court can be costly and time consuming, and they can irreparably damage relationships among heirs.
Are Lady Bird Deeds Legal in South Carolina?
Lady bird deeds are not codified into law in South Carolina, nor have they been officially recognized by the courts.
However, in at least two instances, South Carolina higher courts have agreed with the intention of an enhanced life estate, or, in its words, a “life estate with the power of disposition,” as far back as 1971. That is, it recognized the right of a life tenant to dispose of the property as they wish without the consent of the remaindermen when this wish was explicitly expressed in the original property owner’s last will. See Blackmon v. Weaver (2005) (here) and Johnson v. Waldrop (1971) (here).
This may be reassuring to those who wish to take advantage of the benefits of a lady bird deed in South Carolina, but it’s still a long way from being widely used and recognized here. Plus, it still doesn’t change the fact that title insurance companies may refuse to issue title insurance without the joinder of the remainder, which could hamper real estate deals. Finally, it’s worth noting that both of the “life estates with the power of disposition” recognized by the courts were created in last wills, not through deeds, meaning that the properties in question were subject to probate.
Alternatives to Lady Bird Deeds in South Carolina
At this time, the most prudent thing to do may be to find an alternative to the lady bird deed if you live in South Carolina or another state where enhanced life estate deeds are not routinely recognized. Some possible alternatives to a lady bird deed, depending on your objectives, include a life estate deed, a transfer-upon-death deed, or a revocable living trust.
If you have questions about your estate plan and are concerned about avoiding probate or ensuring that your property is inherited according to your wishes, call estate planning attorney Gem McDowell at the Gem McDowell Law Group. He and his team can help you create, review, or update your estate plan so it reflects your current life circumstances and future wishes. He can also help you understand the possible consequences of how your estate plan will play out and how that can affect your family members and heirs and prevent friction in the future.
Call Gem today at his office in Mount Pleasant, SC, at 843-284-1021 to schedule your free consultation today.



